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During Angela Merkel’s time as Germany’s Chancellor, the country 
has seen the largest inflow of migrants in its post-war history, but 
overall attitudes to immigration in Germany have been remarkably 
stable and, if anything, have actually become slightly more positive 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017; Eurobarometer, 2017). On the sur-
face, stability seems to be the word that best describes attitudes to 
immigration in Germany. Yet, the anti-immigration Alternative für 
Deutschland (AFD) political party has seen a surge in its opinion poll 
ratings, enjoyed some electoral success, and could enter the Bunde-
stag after the 2017 federal elections. This brief explains how general-
ized favourability to immigration can combine with growth in sup-
port for an anti-immigration party by highlighting the importance of 
issue salience. 
To explore the structure of attitudes to immigration in Germany, this 
policy brief addresses four key features: the overall increase in positive 
attitudes to immigration; levels of issue salience; different perceptions 
of immigration among eastern and western Germans; and, finally the 
role played by wider trust in Germany’s social and political institutions 
in reducing anxiety around immigration. 
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Context – Germany as a Country of 
Immigration
In 2016, there were 18 million people in Germany with 
a migrant background1 or 22.5% of the population. 
The  foreign population numbered 10 million, or 12.1% 
of the population. This made Germany the second 
largest country of immigration in the world after the 
US (Statistisches Bundesamt, OECD). Various waves of 
immigration have shaped Germany’s identity as a country 
of immigration. In the 1950s and 1960s, ‘guestworkers’ 
mainly from Turkey and Southern Europe moved to 
Germany in response to labour shortages. This flow was 
initially considered temporary thus explicit strategies 
to integrate newcomers were not considered. However, 
many immigrants that had come to work in Germany 
eventually settled in the country which led to further 
inflows due to family reunifications in the 1960 and 
1970s. The end of the Cold War brought a new wave of 
immigration of ethnic German Aussiedler from Eastern 
Europe while relatively liberal asylum policies led to a 
peak in asylum applications to Germany in the 80s and 
90s. More restrictive immigration laws slowed down 
the inflow of migrants substantially up to the current 
“migration crisis” (Geddes and Scholten, 2016). In 
2015, with a net inflow of 1,139,000 migrants, Germany 
witnessed the highest level of immigration in Europe and 
in its history. 
Fig 1. Flows of non-Germans
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
1. The Statistisches Bundesamt defines people with migrant 
background all immigrants and foreigners born in Germany
In the late 1990s and 2000s, profound changes in 
Germany’s immigration policies occurred at a time 
when immigration to Germany was relatively low and 
the focus could shift to how to integrate people that had 
settled in the country. In 2005, a systematic integration 
framework was created; the policy debate had changed 
from regulating flows to managing them and recognizing 
that immigrants arriving to Germany were there to stay 
(Abali, 2009). In parallel to this shift in policy focus, 
Germans’ attitudes to immigration were becoming 
progressively more positive. The percentage of Germans 
who believed there were too many immigrants living in 
Germany went down from 79% in 1984 to 53% in 2008 
(Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1984 and 2008).
During the migration crisis of 2015, Germany was by 
far the top European destination for immigrants and 
Merkel’s ‘open-door ‘policy towards asylum seekers has 
been a major topic of debate. However, as shown below, 
this did not lead to a general increase in anti-immigration 
sentiment. 
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Attitudes to Immigration are Stable (or 
Slightly More Positive)
Between 2014 and 2017, the percentage of people stating 
that “immigration of people from outside the EU” evoked 
“positive feelings” grew from 30% to 39% (Figure 2). 
Germany is not alone in this regard. A similar increase 
in positive attitudes to immigration seems to be taking 
place in much of Western Europe. In contrast, in Central 
and Eastern European countries attitudes seem to be 
hardening. 
Fig. 2 Percentage reporting positive feelings 
towards immigration from outside the EU
Source: Eurobarometer 
Attitudes to immigration however are a multidimensional 
construct. This means that, when forming attitudes, 
people consider the economic impact of immigration, 
its cultural impact, whether the country should have a 
moral obligation to take in migrants, whether migrants 
are refugees or have economic motivations and a plethora 
of other issues. A study by Purpose found that most 
Germans (58%) are neither completely “anti” or “pro” 
immigration but fall in an “anxious middle” (IPSOS, 
2016). 21% of Germans reported being sceptical of the 
impact immigration could have on Germany but believed 
that the country had the moral duty to welcome certain 
migrants. Another fifth of the population considered 
immigrants an important economic asset for Germany 
but expressed concern about differences in lifestyle and 
values.
Over the years, there has been consensus among policy 
makers in Germany about the need for labour migration 
to sustain the country’s economy (Abali, 2009; Duffy 
et al., 2014). With an average of 46.8 years, Germany is 
second only to Japan in the average age of its population 
and faces a shrinking working-age population (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2017). These considerations on 
ageing and the economy have often been part of the 
discourse on immigration in Germany and seems to be 
reflected in the population’s overall positive attitudes to 
the economic impacts of immigration. Furthermore, 
the country’s strong economic performance and low 
unemployment rates in recent years, have given lower 
resonance to negative arguments on migration’s possible 
negative economic effects. 
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Fig. 3 Percentage saying immigration is good for 
the economy2
Source: European Social Survey, 2014
Salience of Immigration
While attitudes seem to have become more positive from 
2014 to 2017, support in opinion polls for the AfD grew 
after 2015, reaching peaks of about 15% throughout 2016 
(average of polling data) and around 12% in the run 
up to the 2017 federal elections. How can generalized 
favourability about immigration be reconciled with 
growth in support for an anti-immigration political 
party? This apparent incongruence can be explained by 
examining issue salience, or considering how important 
people perceive immigration to be. Voters are likely to 
make their choices evaluating parties’ stances on several 
issues; when immigration is not salient, it is unlikely 
that it will determine voters’ choices. The salience of 
immigration therefore activates latent negative attitudes 
in the population. Before the migration and refugee crisis, 
most Germans considered immigration to be a relatively 
unimportant issue. Until 2013, Germans were less likely 
than other Europeans to mention immigration as one of 
the key problems facing their country (Figure 4). 
2.  Respondents are asked to assign a score from 0 (immigration 
is bad for the economy) to ten (immigration is good for the 
economy). Here, the percentage of those that pick 6 or higher are 
considered.
The salience of immigration in Germany peaked in late 
2015 and has remained one of the most important issue 
in the country since 2014. This has coincided with a 
sharp decline in recent years in the perceived importance 
of economic issues probably due to the country’s 
relatively strong economy. The AfD’s increased profile as 
Germany’s foremost anti-immigration party runs parallel 
to this trend. In 2016, it obtained significant electoral 
successes, in particular in Saxony-Anhalt where it got 
24.3% of votes and in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
where its attracted 20.8% support. The AfD now holds 
seats in the parliaments of 13 out of the 16 federal states. 
It is however far more rooted in the Eastern part of the 
country where, as shown in the next section, attitudes 
towards immigration are more negative than in the West. 
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Figure 4. Most important issues in Germany3
Source: Eurobarometer
East-West Differences in Attitudes to 
Immigration
Attitudes to immigration vary greatly between East and 
West Germany. This seems to follow a wider European 
pattern: Western European countries are on average 
much more open to immigration than Central and East 
European countries. These differences are also stable 
over time and are likely to have their roots in how 
history shaped countries’ social structure and attitudes 
in general. Western European countries have more 
of a history of immigration while Eastern Europe has 
historically seen more emigration. Therefore, in Western 
Europe, immigrants and associated multiculturalism are 
more familiar. In Germany, most migrants have settled 
in the West and in Berlin, areas in which attitudes to 
immigration are more positive. A commonly stated 
hypothesis is that repeated and significant contact 
with migrants has a liberalising effect on attitudes to 
immigration (e.g. Dixon, 2006; Ha, 2010). Anxieties 
concerning migrants’ difference in values, lifestyles, and 
security concerns seem to be reduced when local people 
are in contact with migrants. Some scholars have also 
suggested that the structure of attitudes to immigration 
is different in the East as opposed to the West. Eastern 
Germans that hold negative attitudes to immigration are 
more likely to fear economic competition from migrants 
than their Western counterparts (Clark and Legge, 1997).
3.  Respondents are asked to select two issues. The graph shows the 
percentage of people selecting each issue.
Figure 5. Percentage of foreign population per 
federal state
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2015
Figure 6. Percentage saying some or many migrants 
from poorer countries outside Europe should be 
allowed to settle in Germany
Source: European Social Survey 2014
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Figure 1 shows that attitudes in Germany as a whole 
have become more positive from 2014 to 2017. This 
has, however, happened at different rates in Western 
and Eastern Germany. While in Western Germany 
the percentage of those reporting positive feelings to 
immigration from outside the EU went from 35% to 
48%, in the Eastern part of the country it increased much 
less substantially - from 24% to 28%. Once again, this 
difference mirrors what happened in Europe as a whole; 
attitudes in Western countries have on average become 
more positive while Eastern countries have overall 
become more sceptical of immigration.
Trust in Institutions – “Wir schaffen das”
Since the landmark reforms in immigration policy of 
the early 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of 
Germany as an immigration country. This has spurred 
a strong commitment to making integration work. 
Incorporating migrants into the labour market and 
into Germany’s social fabric have been federal priorities 
for the ten years preceding the migration crisis (Abali, 
2009; Duffy et al., 2014). Germany’s transparent and 
comprehensive management of migration led to 
relatively widespread satisfaction with how the country 
was dealing with migration in the years immediately 
preceding the migration and refugee crisis. In 2013, 
54% of Germans thought the government was managing 
migration well compared to a European average of 31% 
(Duffy et al., 2014). Germany’s solid economy could 
have also reinforced the perception that the country was 
strong and able to deal with migrants’ integration into the 
labour market. The migration crisis therefore came at a 
moment of relative confidence in the government’s ability 
to deal with the sudden influx of migrants – Merkel’s 
statement “wir schaffen das” (“we can do this”) is likely 
to have resonated with large sectors of the population. 
When asked in late 2016 whether the government had 
responded well to the refugee crisis, Germans were 
among the most likely to give a positive answer (Figure 7). 
Hungary and Poland, the two countries that score higher 
than Germany, enacted completely different responses 
to the crisis by restricting access. Therefore, approval of 
their government’s management to the crisis takes on a 
very different meaning.
Figure 7. Percentage of respondents that believe the 
country has responded well to the refugee crisis
Source: IPSOS Global Advisor 2016
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A recent Bertelsmann Stiftung report has highlighted that 
resentment against the establishment and polarisation in 
Germany are relatively low. On refugee policy, German 
public opinion seems to be keener on a government that 
‘controls’ and manages migration effectively than on 
preventing migrants from settling in the country (Duffy 
et al., 2014; Vehrkamp and Wratil, 2017). 
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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to 
develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, Euro-
pean societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and 
hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. 
The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of 
European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the 
wider world.
Migration Policy Centre
The Migration Policy Centre (MPC) conducts advanced policy-oriented research on global migration, asy-
lum and mobility. It serves governance needs at European and global levels, from developing, implement-
ing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy and society.
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